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I.  Introduction 
Copyright law in the United States grants visual artists1 the right to 
control reproductions and adaptations of their original works2 as well as the 
 
* Georgia Athletic Association, Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, 
Oberlin College, B.A., 1972, University of Chicago Law School, J.D., 1975 
 1. For purposes of this article, visual artists include painters, illustrators, sculptors, and 
photographers. Office of the Register of Copyrights, Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis 1 
(December 2013) [hereinafter Register’s Update]. 
 2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) & (2). 
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moral rights of attribution and integrity.3  It also gives artists the exclusive 
right to control the first public distribution of their works.4  Copyright does 
not, however, give visual artists the right to royalties on resales of their 
works of art even if they retain their copyrights.  Instead, it provides that 
the owner of an acquired work of art “is entitled, without authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of that copy.”5  The 
purchaser’s right to resell the work of art is protected by copyright’s first 
sale doctrine.6  Bills to amend the first sale doctrine to provide a resale 
royalty for works of visual art, also called droit de suite, have been 
proposed since the 1970s.7  This legislation would give artists a percentage 
of the amount paid for one of their works each time that work is resold by 
another party.  It recognizes that the increase in the value of original art 
works is due more to the artist’s subsequent works and increased popularity 
than to anything done by the initial buyer.8  Resale royalties enable artists 
to share in the long term financial success of their works.9 
Notwithstanding this rationale for enacting a resale royalty as well as 
perceived disparities between copyright’s treatment of visual artists 
compared to other creators10 and endorsement of droit de suite by the 
Register of Copyrights in 2013,11 federal proposals on resale royalty have 
not reached a consensus.12  However, the California legislature enacted its 
own Resale Royalties Act (CRRA) in 1976.  In simplified form, the Act 
provides a five percent royalty to the artist for any original work that is sold 
for $1,000 or more whenever the seller resides in California, or the sale 
takes place in California, if the resale price exceeds the purchase price paid 
by the seller.13  Shortly after its passage, the CRRA was challenged as an 
 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. See generally David Shipley, The Empty Promise of VARA: The 
Restrictive Application of a Narrow Statute, 83 MISS. L.J. 985 (2014) [hereinafter The Empty 
Promise]. 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 6. Quality King Distribs Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141 – 142 
(1998); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349 – 50 (1908). 
 7. Droit de Suite: The Artist’s Resale Royalty, December 1992, A Report of the Register 
of Copyrights, at 86 [hereinafter Register’s 1992 Report]; Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 6 – 
9.  
 8. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 11 – 12. 
 9. Id. at 1.  
 10. See infra notes 25 to 32. 
 11. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 65 – 66. 
 12. Id. at 9-12; Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 86. 
 13. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 986(a) & (b); see G.L. Francione, The California Art Preservation 
Act and Federal Preemption by the 1976 Act – Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 31 ASCAP 
COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. 105, 106 – 10 (1984) (noting that California’s law is broader than its 
European counterparts) [hereinafter G.L. Francione].  Until 2015 the CRRA mandated a royalty if 
the seller resided in California, regardless of where the sale takes place.  This was held to be 
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impermissible limitation on the purchaser’s right under the first sale 
doctrine to distribute his or her lawfully purchased work of art. In 1980 the 
Ninth Circuit held in Morseburg v. Balyon that the CRRA was not 
preempted under the 1909 Copyright Act because it merely supplemented 
copyright law by providing an additional right to the artist, and this royalty 
right did not impermissibly restrict resales.14  The court stated clearly that it 
was not addressing whether the CRRA might be preempted under section 
301 of the then recently enacted Copyright Act of 1976.15 
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a lower court decision from a 
series of consolidated cases filed in 2011, in which the CRRA was 
challenged by art dealers and auction houses.16  In an en banc ruling, the 
court affirmed the district court’s holding that the sections of the statute 
regulating out-of-state sales were unconstitutional under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause but held, contrary to the lower court’s decision, that the 
CRRA’s sections regulating sales within California were severable.17  The 
Supreme Court declined to review the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.18  The case 
was remanded to the district court, in which the defendants repeated 
preemption arguments similar to those made three decades earlier in 
Morseburg, while also asserting that the statute was preempted under the 
1976 Copyright Act’s preemption provision; section 301.19 
 
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause.  However, an artist’s right to a royalty 
when his or her art is resold within California was treated as severable; see infra notes 16 to 19 
and 96 to 106 and accompanying text. 
 14. 621 F.2d 972, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980). 
 15. Id. at 975 & n.2 (the sales in question were before the Copyright Act of 1976 became 
effective on January 1, 1978).  See also infra note 87. 
 16. The cases are Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., The Sam Francis Foundation v. 
Christies, Inc., and Sam Francis Foundation v. eBay Inc.  In all three the plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants failed to honor their obligations under the CRRA, and the defendants responded 
by arguing that the statute was invalid on several different grounds.  The cases were ultimately 
consolidated.  See infra notes 96 to 106 and accompanying text.  
 17. Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 795 (2016).  The trial court had held that the provisions regulating sales out of state could 
not be severed. Gonzalo Zeballos, “Artists and Auction Houses Declare Victory Over California 
Artists’ Resale Royalties Statute”, MONDAQ (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.mondaq.com/united 
states/x/467490/music+arts/Artists+and+Auction+Houses+Declare+Victory+Over+California+Ar
tists+Resale+Royalties+Statute; Dennis Cohen, “Ninth Circuit Draws Fine Line Around Fine Art 
Resale Royalties”, IP INTELLIGENCE (May 12, 2015), https://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2015/ 
05/12/ninth-circuit-draws-fine-line-around-fine-art-resale-royalties/. 
 18. Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 795 (2016); Brian Boucher, Supreme Court Declines to Hear Artists’ Resale Royalty Suit – 
Who Wins?, ART WORLD (Jan. 12, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/supreme-court-
declines-artists-resale-royalty-appeal-406106.  See generally Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 
21 – 22. 
 19. Eric Hiatt, “Validity of California Resale Royalty Act Faces Another Court Challenge”, 
COPYRIGHT, CONTENT, AND PLATFORMS (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.copyrightcontentplatforms. 
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On remand, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California held in Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc. that recent decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit “have so eroded 
Morseburg that it no longer represents a binding interpretation of the first 
sale doctrine and the CRRA.”20  The court ultimately held that the CRRA 
was preempted because it conflicted with the first sale doctrine codified in 
section 109 of the Copyright Act, and also because the artists’ claims for 
unpaid royalties under the CRRA were independently preempted under 
section 301(a).  The court said the artists’ claims were not qualitatively 
different from garden variety copyright claims.21 
The Estate of Graham decision certainly will be reviewed by the 
Ninth Circuit and might eventually find its way to the Supreme Court.  The 
high court has not addressed a preemption issue in the general field of 
intellectual property since the Bonito Boats decision in 1989,22 and it has 
never addressed a preemption issue arising under section 301 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.  The focus of this article is not about whether the 
United States should implement droit de suite.23  Rather, this article 
concentrates on two relatively narrow questions: (1) whether the CRRA is 
preempted under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause (conflict 
preemption) because it disrupts Congress’s efforts to balance the interests 
of copyright right owners and consumers; and (2) whether it is preempted 
under section 301 of the Copyright Act (express preemption).  This article 
concludes that the federal district court in Estate of Graham arrived at the 
right conclusion: the CRRA, California’s droit de suite statute, is 
preempted under either section 301 of the Copyright Act or under conflict 
preemption analysis because the statute frustrates the purposes of copyright 
law’s well-established first sale doctrine. 
 
com/2016/02/validity-of-california-resale-royalty-act-faces-another-court-challenge/; Howard B. 
Abrams, 1 The Law of Copyright § 5:188 (2015). 
 20. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2016), motion to alter and amend denied, 2016 WL 
4136540 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 21. 2016 WL 1464229, at *9. 
 22. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); PAUL GOLDSTEIN 
& R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 
642-79 (Foundation Press, 7th ed. 2012), (coverage of the U.S. Supreme Court’s intellectual 
property preemption decisions from Sears in 1964 through Bonito Boats in 1989). 
 23. There is abundant literature arguing for and against recognition of droit de suite in the 
United States.  See, e.g., Gordon Katz, Copyright Preemption Under the Copyright Act of 1976: 
The Case of Droit de Suite, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200 (1978), Monroe Price, Government 
Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333 (1968), 
Carole Vickers, The Applicability of Droit de Suite In the United States, 3 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 433 (1980), Kathryn Bue, Comment, The Droit de Suite Has Arrived: Can It Thrive in 
California As It Has in Calais? 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 529 (1977), Register’s 1992 Report, 
supra note 7, at 149 – 51; Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 4 – 10.  
SHIPLEY(DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2016  4:26 PM 
2017 DROIT DE SUITE, COPYRIGHT’S FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 5 
Part One of this article provides background on droit de suite and its 
lack of recognition in the United States.24  Part Two explains the tension 
between the resale royalty and copyright principles, particularly the first 
sale doctrine.  Parts Three and Four discuss conflict preemption, the 
Morseburg decision from 1980, and whether Morseburg is still good law 
on preemption.  Part Five of this article discusses whether the CRRA is 
subject to express preemption by section 301(a) of the Copyright Act. Part 
Six of the article discusses several other arguments for and against 
preemption of the CRRA.  The Conclusion ties these parts together and 
explains why, on balance, the California statute is subject to conflict 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause and express preemption under the 
Copyright Act. 
II.  A Brief History of Resale Royalty in the United States 
Droit de suite, first introduced in France in the 1920s, gives visual 
artists—primarily painters and sculptors—the right to benefit financially 
from the increased value of their works over time by granting them a 
percentage of the proceeds each time one of their original works is resold.25  
“[I]n other words when an owner of the art object sells it to a third party (if 
the seller makes a profit), the artist receives a payment.”26 
Resale royalty rights derive from moral rights. The two fundamental 
moral rights protect the attribution privilege—paternity—and against the 
mutilation of works—integrity—while droit de suite enables artists to 
benefit from the appreciation in the value of their works of art.27  It is an 
economic right with a moral rights heritage.28  The rationale for providing 
this royalty is based on recognition that unlike authors and composers who 
are able to offer thousands of copies of their works to the public, artists 
create a limited number of unique works.  An author and his or her 
publisher may sell many copies of the same novel; a composer’s popular 
song may be downloaded repeatedly and performed publicly over and over, 
both generating substantial royalties; and a movie may be shown in 
hundreds of theaters across the nation while thousands of DVDs of the film 
may be sold.  In each of these transactions, many members of the general 
public are enjoying the same work and the creator is compensated for many 
of these uses.  On the other hand, visual artists cannot generally rely on 
 
 24. As in the Ninth Circuit’s 1980 preemption decision concerning the CRRA, resolution of 
the dispute over the need for resale royalty legislation is not necessary for purposes of this article.  
Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 976 (1980). 
 25. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 4.  
 26. Corporate Counsel’s Guide to Copyright Law, Resale Royalties § 4:14 (2015). 
 27. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 4.  
 28. G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 109 – 10. 
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repeated uses of their unique works.  The visual artist is compensated when 
he or she sells a painting or sculptural work but, for the most part, the 
artist’s compensation ends because the artist has but one financial interest, 
or perhaps an interest in a few limited editions of a numbered print or 
sculptural work.29  Over time, as an artist’s reputation grows and his or her 
works appreciate in value, the person who stands to gain from subsequent 
sales of those appreciated paintings and sculptural works is the collector, 
not the visual artist who created the work.30  Resale royalty laws address 
this disparity in how copyright law protects and rewards visual artists 
compared to authors, composers and other creators.31  Hence, droit de suite 
can be justified as compensation for the lack of a marketable reproduction 
right for many works of fine art.32 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works was amended in 1948 to include droit de suite; Article 14 of the 
Convention provides creators of original works of art and original 
manuscripts with an inalienable right to an interest in any subsequent sale 
of the work after its first transfer by the creator.33  The resale right is 
optional, meaning that Berne’s member states are not required to 
implement droit de suite.34  Still, at least 70 countries currently have 
legislation protecting artists’ resale royalty rights.35  Droit de suite is well-
established in Europe and the European Union (“EU”) harmonized droit de 
suite laws in 2001, notwithstanding hesitation from the “United Kingdom 
(“UK”).  The United States has been adhering to the Berne Convention 
since 1989 but Congress has not enacted droit de suite legislation.36  The 
Berne Convention also makes droit de suite a reciprocal right.  This means 
 
 29. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 10 – 11; Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 
125. 
 30. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 11.  “An increase in the price of an artist’s works 
after they have left his hands may be the result of greater recognition of the artist, an increase in 
the overall demand for art works, inflation, unpredictable shifts in fashion and taste, or some 
combination of the above.”  Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d at 976 
 31. Paul Katzenberger, The Droit de Suite in Copyright Law, 4 IIC, INT’L REV. OF INDUS. 
PROP. AND COPYRIGHT LAW 361, 368 (1973).  
 32. Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 125 – 26.  Royalty rights are needed because 
artists are not adequately compensated for their contributions to society due to complex factors 
determining the value of original works of art and because existing forms of protection—
copyright law and contract law—have not helped because original works of visual art are not 
often reproduced and artists often lack bargaining power.  Sharon Emley, The Resale Royalties 
Act: Paintings, Preemption and Profit, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.  239, 240 – 40 (1978) 
(hereinafter Emley). 
 33. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 4.  
 34. Id. at 4 – 5. 
 35. Id. at 13 – 19; Zeballos, supra note 17. 
 36. Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 33 – 38 (9th Edition 2013), LexisNexis (discussion of 
the United States becoming a signatory to the Berne Convention). 
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that if a member state does not grant a resale royalty, its citizens cannot 
benefit from the right in other countries which have enacted droit de suite.  
Since Congress has not enacted resale royalty, artists from the U.S. do not 
earn royalties from resale of their works in countries with resale royalty 
protection.37 
Bills to amend the Copyright Act to provide for resale royalties were 
introduced as early as 1978.38  When Congress enacted the Visual Artists 
Rights Act in 1990, it directed the Register of Copyrights to study the 
feasibility of implementing resale royalty legislation in the United States.39  
The Register concluded in 1992 that droit de suite might not be an 
appropriate addition to U.S. copyright law because it would not fit well 
with our free market traditions.40  However, two decades later, after 
updating that 1992 study, the Register changed course to state that it 
“supports the right as one alternative to address the disparity in treatment of 
artists under the copyright law.”41  Still, Congress has not acted. 
Efforts to incorporate this concept in state law in the United States 
have not been successful but for the California statute, which is the primary 
focus of this article.  However, legislation was introduced in 11 other states 
including New York and Illinois.42  The California Resale Royalty Act 
(CRRA), which applies to fine art—defined as original paintings, 
sculptures, drawings and glass works—requires the seller of fine art to pay 
the artist a 5% royalty when a work is resold in California or resold 
anywhere by a California resident.43  This right cannot be waived unless 
there is a written contract providing for a royalty in excess of 5%.44  The 
seller of the art work, or that seller’s agent, is required upon a sale to 
withhold 5% of the sale price, find the artist, and then pay the artist.  If the 
artist is not paid, he or she may bring a civil action for damages.  The 
CRRA also provides that the prevailing party shall be entitled to attorney’s 
 
 37. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 4 – 5. 
 38. Id. at 6 – 10 and 23 – 25 (discussing proposed legislation). 
 39. The Register’s 1992 study of resale royalty legislation was the result of section 608 of 
the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (legislation that amended the Copyright Act to add limited 
protection of artists’ moral rights).  This section required the Register of Copyrights to study the 
feasibility of implementing a resale royalty right for visual artists in the United States. 
 40. Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, Executive Summary at xiv-xv.  See also 
Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 8. 
 41. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 3.  See generally Herbert Lazerow, Art Resale 
Royalty Options, 63 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 201 (2016) (a comprehensive discussion of possible 
legislation with comparison to laws in Australia, England, France as well as California).  
 42. Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 75. 
 43. Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a).  The act is applicable only if at the time of resale the artist is 
either a citizen of the United States or a resident of California for a minimum of two years. Id. § 
986(c)(1). 
 44. Id. § 986(a).  
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fees.  This royalty right succeeds to the artist’s heirs for 20 years after the 
artist’s death.45  Artists’ rights to this royalty do not depend on their 
retaining copyright to their works of art.46 
III.  The CRRA/Copyright Conflicts 
The CRRA is limited to the resale of paintings, sculptural works, and 
drawings.47  Such works fall within the Copyright Act’s “pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural work” category of copyrightable subject matter,48 and are 
defined as follows: 
. . . two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, 
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art 
reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and 
technical drawings, including architectural plans. . . .49 
The owner of copyright in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work has 
the right to reproduce the work in copies, to prepare derivative works based 
upon the work, to distribute copies of the work to the public, and to display 
the work publicly.50 
 Section 202 of the Copyright Act provides: 
Ownership of a copyright . . . is distinct from ownership of any 
material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of 
ownership of any material object, including the copy or 
phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself 
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the 
object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of 
ownership of a copyright . . . convey property rights in any 
material object.51 
Hence, the purchaser of a painting or sculptural work from an artist 
owns the object but not the copyright unless the artist transfers some or all 
of the rights in the copyright bundle.  The purchaser cannot reproduce the 
painting, modify it or, subject to certain limitations, publicly display it 
without the artist’s permission.  These are some of the exclusive rights that 
the artist retains even though he or she no longer possesses the tangible 
 
 45. Id. §§ 986(a) & (b).  See generally Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 65 – 68. 
 46. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 20 – 21.  See generally G.L. Francione, supra note 
13, at 106 & n.6 (summary of the California law). 
 47. Cal. Civ. Code § 986(c)(2). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). 
 49. Id. § 101 (definitions). 
 50. Id. §§ 106(1), (2), (3) & (5). 
 51. Id. § 202. 
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object.  Section 202 reversed a common law copyright doctrine in some 
jurisdictions that established that artists were presumed to transfer their 
rights when they sold their works of art.52  Under the Copyright Act, a 
transfer of copyright ownership is not valid unless it is in writing, signed by 
the owner of the rights being conveyed.53 
The right at issue with resale royalty statutes is the copyright holder’s 
exclusive right to “distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or 
lending.”54 
The Copyright Act defines “copies” as: 
material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is 
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from 
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. The term “copies” includes the material object, other than 
a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.55 
Combining the distribution right with the definition of “copies” means 
that an artist has the right to decide when to sell his or her painting or 
sculptural work.  The distribution right, also called “the right of first 
publication,” “implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in 
what form to release his work.  First publication is inherently different from 
other § 106 rights in that only one person can be the first publisher.”56 
The distribution right is limited by the first sale doctrine, codified at 
section 109(a). It provides: 
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a 
particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled 
without authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the possession of that copy…. 
The first sale doctrine provides that “once the copyright owner places 
a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has 
exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.”57  The 
doctrine was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1908 in Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. v. Straus58 in which the exclusive right to vend under the pre-1909 
 
 52. Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc, 39 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1942); Katz, supra note 23, at 201. 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). 
 54. Id. § 106(3). 
 55. Id. § 101 (definition of “copies”). 
 56. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553 (1985). 
 57. Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc. 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998). 
 58. See 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
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statute was interpreted as limited to the initial sale of the work, but not 
resales.  The doctrine was codified in section 27 of the Copyright Act of 
1909 and then reaffirmed in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976.  
The Supreme Court has stated that the first sale doctrine creates robust 
secondary markets by “leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each 
other when reselling or otherwise disposing of those goods.” It shifts 
market power away from copyright owners to competitors in order to 
“advantage  . . . the consumer.”59 
What does this mean for visual artists and their paintings and 
sculptural works?  Sections 202 and 109(a) combine to mean that the 
purchaser of a painting or sculptural work is free to sell or otherwise 
dispose of that work of art—the object—without permission of the artist 
even when the artist retains the copyright on that work of art.  However, the 
purchaser/owner cannot reproduce the painting as a poster or greeting card, 
or adapt it for a wallpaper pattern or fabric design, without the artist’s 
permission.  Also, the purchaser/owner of the object—the work of art—can 
also display it, either directly or by projection of a single image, to viewers 
present at the place where the object is located without infringing on the 
artist’s right to control public displays of the work.60  The basic principle of 
first sale is that the buyer of a copyrighted work like a painting is free to 
dispose of it as he or she wishes without regard to the wishes of the 
copyright holder.61  The artist/copyright holder cannot use the distribution 
right to fix resale prices in downstream markets because that right is 
limited to the first sale of the work.62 
The conflict preemption issue is whether California’s droit de suite 
statute is at odds with fundamental copyright principles by simultaneously: 
(1) improperly enhancing an artist’s distribution right; and (2) improperly 
limiting a purchaser’s first sale right under section 109(a) to distribute his 
or her lawfully purchased copy of a work of art.  Or in other words, to sell 
the object.  Is the statute an impermissible restraint on alienation?  Does it 
undermine first sale and the principle of free alienation of personal property 
by preventing buyers of fine art from acquiring unencumbered title to a 
work of fine art?63 
 
 59. Kirtsaeng. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013). 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) as limited by 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).  Assuming the work of visual art 
comes within the scope of VARA, the artist also retains his moral rights of integrity and 
attribution whether or not he or she assigns copyright to the purchaser of the work of art. Id. § 
106A.  See also The Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 993 – 94. 
 61. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355; Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 
695 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 62. Omega S.A., 776 F.3d at 695. 
 63. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 58. 
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The express preemption issue turns on the interpretation and 
application of section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, which provides: 
all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified 
by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of 
copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created 
before or after that date, [January 1, 1978] and whether published 
or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, 
no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any 
such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 
Section 301 reflects congressional intent to preempt and abolish state 
common law copyright and any rights under common law or statute that are 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright owners and 
that extend to works coming within the scope of copyright law.64  Deciding 
whether a state law claim is preempted under section 301(a) has two steps; 
both of which must be satisfied.  A court first has to determine whether the 
subject matter of the state claim falls within the subject matter of copyright 
under section 102.  This is a given with the CRRA because the subject 
matter of an artist’s claim for unpaid resale royalties is a copyrighted work 
of fine art.65  The second inquiry is whether the right being asserted is 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights contained in section 106.  If it is, 
then the state law claim is preempted.66  If the state law claim is, in essence, 
qualitatively no different from a copyright infringement claim, it will be 
preempted.67  This is also shown by section 301(b) which provides that 
states may protect rights and interests which are not equivalent to those 
protected by federal copyright law.  “Therefore, only the equivalency 
requirement of the statutory test need be considered. If the rights conferred 
by [the CRRA] are equivalent to those conferred by the Copyright Act . . .” 
the CRRA is preempted.68 
 
 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 1476-94, at 31 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP.]. 
 65. Emley, supra note 32, at 254. 
 66. Laws v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 67. Id. at 1144. 
 68. Emley, supra note 32, at 254.  The CRRA’s sponsor in the California legislature 
acknowledged that the law might be preempted by the Copyright Act.  G.L Francione, supra note 
13, at 107 n.6. 
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IV.  Morseburg v. Balyon and Conflict Preemption 
Preemption doctrine, derived from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, nullifies a state statute or common law that frustrates 
accomplishing the objectives of an act of Congress.69  “[T]he extent to 
which the federal laws has ‘occupied the field’ and the presence of 
‘conflict’ between the federal and state laws have always been focuses of 
analytic attention.  The nature of the Court’s emphasis at a particular time 
is revealed by whether ‘occupation of the field’ and ‘conflict’ are easily 
found to exist or not.”70  The Supreme Court has decided seven cases since 
1964 involving the preemption of state law affecting some type of 
intellectual property.  The Court’s initial rulings in the companion cases of 
Sears and Compco seemed strong and unambiguous: a state cannot prevent 
the copying of an article unprotected by a patent or copyright under its law 
of unfair competition.71  This promoted national uniformity. However, it 
soon became clear that these decisions did not prevent the states from 
providing limited forms of protection to subject matter which falls within 
the patent and copyright domains.  For example, dicta in Lear, Inc. v. 
Adkins72 recognized a state’s power to enforce a promise to pay royalties 
for use of an unpatentable invention while the patent application was 
pending.  These decisions promoted federalism.73 
When analyzing the CRRA it becomes especially relevant to consider 
Goldstein v. California,74 in which the Court held that the Constitution’s 
grant of copyright power to Congress was not exclusive.  The defendants 
argued that the Copyright Act of 1909, which excluded sound recordings 
from its coverage, preempted state protection of those “writings,”75 but the 
Court upheld California’s statute, which made record piracy a criminal 
offense.76  It said that the states retained concurrent power to protect some 
works of authorship if such protection did not conflict with federal law.77  It 
saw no Congressional intent to foreclose state regulation of sound 
recordings—a category of writings left unprotected by Congress at that 
time—so long as state regulation did not interfere with federal copyright 
 
 69. Hines v. Davidovwitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 70. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d at 976. 
 71. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Ralph Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 1341, 1359 (1987). 
 72. 395 U.S. 653, 674-75 (1969). 
 73. Cf. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d at 976. 
 74. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
 75. Id. at 566. 
 76. Id. at 570 – 71. 
 77. Id. at 552 – 61. 
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law policy.78  Nothing indicated that sound recordings had to be free of 
state control.79  The states could thus afford copyright-like protection to 
these published writings that did not, at that time, fall within the scope of 
federal copyright law.  However, the Court also noted that “a conflict 
[leading to preemption] would develop if a state attempted to protect that 
which Congress intended to be free from restraint or to free that which 
Congress had protected.”80 
The other post-Sears and Compco decisions; Kewanee Oil v. Bicron 
Corp., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., and Bonito Boats v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc. demonstrate that the Supreme Court regards state and 
federal regulation of intellectual property as concurrent.81  Federal controls 
do not displace a state’s statutory or common law forms of protection 
merely because the state doctrine is related to intellectual property 
potentially eligible for patent or copyright protection.82  State regulation of 
intellectual property is preempted when it conflicts with the objectives of 
federal law.83  State law must give way when it disrupts the delicate 
balance between the copyright holders and the general public that Congress 
seeks to maintain when promulgating copyright law.84 
The first version of the CRRA was upheld against a preemption 
challenge over 35 years ago in Morseburg v. Baylon,85 due in large part to 
the Supreme Court’s Goldstein decision.86  The suit was filed by a Los 
Angeles art dealer who had sold two paintings in 1977, triggering his 
obligation to pay royalties under the statute.  He sought a declaratory 
judgment that the law was preempted by the Copyright Act of 1909.87  The 
 
 78. Id. at 564-69; see also Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977 (saying that Congress had evidenced 
no intent to bar states from exercising their power—so the area had not been fully controlled by 
federal authority). 
 79. 412 U.S. at 566. 
 80. Id. at 559. 
 81. 416 U.S. 470 (1974); 440 U.S. 257 (1979); 489 U.S. 141 (1989).  In these cases, state 
law affords protection to subject matter that was unprotected by copyright or design patent as a 
matter of federal law. 
 82. 440 U.S. at 266. 
 83. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 479. 
 84. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).  See 
generally David E. Shipley, Refusing To Rock The Boat: The Sears/Compco Preemption Doctrine 
Applied To Bonito Boats V. Thunder Craft, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 385, 387 – 91 (1990) 
[hereinafter “Rock the Boat”]. 
 85. CV 77-2410, 1978 WL 980 *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 1978), aff’d, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980). 
 86. “We hold that Goldstein governs this case.”  Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d at 977. 
 87. 1978 WL 980, at *2.  He also claimed that the law unduly burdened interstate 
commerce, deprived him of property without due process, and retroactively altered the terms of 
the contract by which he bought the works of art.  The district court ruled against him on all of 
these challenges but did not reach the commerce clause issue because the transactions took place 
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distribution right was called “the right to vend” in section 1 of the 1909 
statute, and the first sale doctrine was codified at section 27 that provided: 
“but nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the 
transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has 
been lawfully obtained.”  The art dealer argued that the CRRA impaired an 
artist’s ability to vend his works of fine art, and also restricted the transfer 
of the work when in the hands of someone, like him, who had lawfully 
obtained the work from the artist.  And thus, the CRRA conflicted with the 
1909 Act and should be preempted.88 
The lower court concluded that the CRRA was not preempted, 
reasoning that no congressional intent was present seeking to regulate the 
sale of works of art.  In addition, the statute did not affect the compensation 
the artist received on making the first transfer of the art work so it did not 
conflict with the right to vend.  The court did not address the alleged 
conflict with first sale but stated that the CRRA did not frustrate federal 
objectives; rather, it encouraged the production and distribution of 
copyrightable works of fine art, and helped reward artists for their creative 
efforts.89 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
1973 decision in Goldstein that had upheld California’s record piracy 
statute against a preemption challenge.  After discussing the CRRA and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to preemption, the court said that the case 
was governed by Goldstein and that neither the Copyright Clause nor the 
1909 Act prevented California from enacting the statute.90  In regard to the 
alleged conflict with the right to vend, the court held that an artist who 
creates a copyrighted work of fine art has, prior to its sale, title to that work 
and all the rights given by copyright.  These rights did not include the right 
afforded by the CRRA which was seen “as an additional right similar to the 
protection afforded by California’s anti-pirating statute upheld in 
Goldstein.”91  In passing the CRRA, as when it enacted the anti-piracy 
statute, California had acted in an area left unattended by Congress.  The 
fact that this additional right could not be waived or transferred did not 
 
within California. 1978 WL 980, at *4; Emley, supra note 32, at 259 – 60.  The 1909 Act applied 
because the claim arose before January 1, 1978, the effective date of the 1976 Act.  1978 WL 
980, at *3.  The 1976 Act does not apply to causes of action arising from undertakings 
commenced before January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(2). 
 88. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 975. 
 89. 1978 WL 980, at *2.  See Emley, supra note 32, at 260.  The district court also 
suggested that the CRRA would not be preempted under the Copyright Act of 1976, stating “it 
appears that the Resale Royalties Act is not preempted by the Revision Act of 1976.”  1978 WL 
980, at *3; Emley, supra note 32, at 260. 
 90. Morseburg, 621 F.2d. at 977. 
 91. Id. 
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limit any right created by federal law.  Moreover, the court said that the 
California statute did not impair the artist’s “‘exclusive right to transfer the 
title for consideration to others’ because “it merely create[d] a right in 
personam against a seller of a ‘work of fine art.’”92  In short, the CRRA did 
not prevent the creator from vending his or her work. 
In regard to the first sale doctrine the court concluded that section 27 
of the Copyright Act of 1909 did not, by implication, preclude states from 
passing resale royalty legislation because it did not “technically speaking” 
restrict the transfer of works of art.93  It explained that the CRRA did not 
restrict transfer because no lien attached to the art object and the buyer was 
not secondarily liable for the royalty.  In addition, the fact that resale might 
create a liability to the artist and simultaneously be the “exercise of a right 
guaranteed by the Copyright Act,” did not make the artist’s right to the 
royalty a legal restraint on the dealer’s right to sell the work.94  In short, the 
statute was not preempted by the Copyright Act of 1909 because imposing 
the royalty did not impermissibly restrict the owner’s right to resell the 
work. 
However, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that imposing the royalty 
could influence behavior by purchasers of fine art who later considered 
selling their works, but that these possibilities—a longer holding period to 
defer the sale until greater appreciation in its value and the impact on the 
volume of business in a particular art market—did not prevent the court 
from concluding that “the 1909 Copyright Act has not occupied the area 
with which we are concerned and the California Act is not in conflict with 
it.”  It said that “the two laws function harmoniously rather than 
discordantly.”95  The Copyright Act was not hostile to the state’s resale 
royalty.96  As noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit was explicit that it was not 
considering whether the CRRA might be preempted under section 301 of 
the then recently enacted Copyright Act of 1976.97 
About thirty years later, a California federal district court held in Baby 
Moose Drawings, Inc. v. Dean Valentine in 2011, that the CRRA was not 
preempted by copyright law.98  The court relied on the House Judiciary 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 977 – 78. 
 95. Id. at 978.  See also Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 81 – 83. 
 96. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978. 
 97. Id. at 975; see also supra note 87.  The transaction at issue took place prior to the 
enactment of the 1976 Act.  Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 21.  The court also found that the 
CRRA did not violate the contracts or due process clauses of the Constitution.  621 F.2d at 979 – 
80. 
 98. No. 2:11–cv–00697–JHN–JCGx, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72583 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 
2011) [hereinafter “Baby Moose”]. 
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Committee Report on the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990 to find that “Congress clearly intended for the Royalty Act to 
withstand preemption by the Copyright Act,” noting that the Committee 
understood that the Copyright Act “will not preempt a cause of action 
for . . . a right to a resale royalty” under the CRRA.99  However, neither the 
CRRA nor Baby Moose fared well in three related actions which were filed 
in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in 2011.  The 
cases are Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., The Sam Francis Foundation 
v. Christie’s, Inc. and The Sam Francis Foundation v. eBay Inc.  In all 
three cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants—two auction houses 
and an online retailer—failed to honor their obligations under the CRRA.100 
The efforts of these several defendants to have the statute struck down 
were partially successful.  Since the CRRA regulated transactions taking 
place outside California as well as in-state sales, the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California held the entire statute unconstitutional for 
violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.101  Baby Moose was 
distinguished as not being relevant to the Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge.102  The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc ruling, affirmed the lower 
court’s decision striking down the sections of the CRRA regulating out-of-
state sales, but held that the sections of the statute regulating sales within 
California were severable.103  This brought the CRRA back to life in 
California to the extent it regulated sellers residing in the state or sales 
taking place in the state.  After the Supreme Court declined to review the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling,104 the case was remanded to the district court where 
the defendants made their arguments as to whether the remaining parts of 
 
 99. Id. at *9-*10 (citation omitted); Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 22 & n.147.  A 
resale royalty provision was removed by Congress from the version of the bill that became the 
Visual Artist’s Rights Act of 1990.  Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 7. 
 100. The three cases were consolidated in one action, with the defendants moving to dismiss 
the complaints on several grounds including violation of the commerce clause, unlawful taking of 
private property, and federal preemption.  Case Summary, Estate of Robert Graham v. Sotheby’s, 
IFAR (International Foundation for Art Research, May 27, 2016 (discussing Sam Francis 
Foundation et al. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 101. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 102. Id. at 1122 n.4; Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 21 – 22. 
 103. Sam Francis Foundation v. Christie’s, 784 F.3d 1320, 1323-26 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  
The trial court held that the provisions regulating sales out of state could not be severed. See also 
Gonzalo Zeballos, supra note 17.  Dennis Cohen, Ninth Circuit Draws Fine Line Around Fine Art 
Resale Royalties, IP INTELLIGENCE (May 12, 2015). 
 104. Sam Francis Foundation v. Christie’s, 136 S. Ct. 795 (2016); Brian Boucher, Supreme 
Court Declines to Hear Artists’ Resale Royalty Suit – Who Wins?, ART WORLD (Jan. 12, 2016). 
See generally Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 21 – 22. 
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the statute were preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act or the 
Supremacy Clause.105 
On remand, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California held in Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc. that recent decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit dealing with first sale 
“have so eroded Morseburg that it no longer represents a binding 
interpretation of the first sale doctrine and the CRRA.”106  The district court 
ultimately held that the CRRA was preempted because it conflicted with 
the first sale doctrine codified in section 109 of the Copyright Act, and also 
because the artists’ claims for unpaid royalties under the CRRA were 
independently preempted under the Copyright Act’s preemption provision, 
section 301, because they were not qualitatively different from garden 
variety copyright claims.107  The next two parts of this article focus on 
whether that federal district court got it right. Part Four explains that 
notwithstanding Morseburg, the CRRA is preempted under conflict 
preemption analysis, and Part Five explains why the CRRA is subject to 
express preemption under section 301. 
V.  Morseburg and Conflict Preemption Redux 
Is the Ninth Circuit’s conflict preemption analysis in Morseburg still 
good?  Assuming that the Estate of Graham decision is reviewed by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, can it justify overruling the 
Ninth Circuit panel which decided Morseburg in 1980?  Yes; things have 
changed since 1980. 
A.  The Law of the Circuit 
There is a rule of appellate procedure called the law of the circuit 
doctrine which decrees that the decision of a three judge panel of the circuit 
is the decision of that circuit; another three-judge panel of the circuit 
should be reluctant to overrule it.108  “[T]he same issue presented in a later 
case in the same court should lead to the same result.”109  This rule exists in 
the federal system to ensure consistency within a circuit.  When one panel 
speaks on a matter of law, subsequent panels should conform so litigants do 
not have to confront contrary legal interpretations within the same circuit.  
 
 105. Eric Hiatt, Baker & Hostetler, VALIDITY OF CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTY ACT FACES 
ANOTHER COURT CHALLENGE, AIPLA NEWSSTAND (Feb. 26, 2016); Howard B. Abrams, 1 The 
Law of Copyright § 5:188 (2015). 
 106. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 107. Id. at *9. 
 108. LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing how one circuit 
panel should be reluctant to overrule another circuit panel’s decision). 
 109. Id. at 1393 (emphasis in the original). 
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A later panel can express disagreement with the reasoning of the earlier 
decision, but should nevertheless go along with that earlier interpretation.110  
As stated by the D.C. Circuit, “[w]ere matters otherwise, the finality of our 
appellate decisions would yield to constant conflicts within the circuit.”111 
This doctrine explains why the district court’s opinion in Estate of 
Graham devotes a hefty amount of effort explaining that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Morseburg v. Balyon is no longer binding nor 
persuasive.112  The doctrine also explains why the district court concluded 
that the CRRA was preempted under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, 
whether or not Morseburg is still binding in the Ninth Circuit 113  The 
district court stated that its conclusion about the Morseburg decision was 
“consistent with settled law [in the Ninth Circuit] permitting district courts 
and three-judge panels to disregard circuit precedent that is irreconcilable 
with later decisions of either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit sitting 
en banc.”114  The court devoted several paragraphs to discussing a 
relatively recent Ninth Circuit en banc ruling in which the court told a 
three-judge panel that it should not have felt bound by an earlier Ninth 
Circuit holding because of two intervening U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions.115  The district court went on to say that Morseburg had been 
undercut by the Supreme Court’s intervening first sale precedent “in more 
obvious ways,” noting that the Morseburg panel barely mentioned the 
purpose of the first sale doctrine and the principle that copyright holders 
cannot use their rights to fix resale prices downstream.116 
Accordingly, the ability of the district court in Estate of Graham to 
escape the Kirtsaeng ruling depends upon the strength of its conflict 
preemption analysis showing that the Ninth Circuit’s 1980 analysis of the 
CRRA, first sale and the right to vend is no longer good law due to the 
Supreme Court’s Quality King and Kirtsaeng decisions.  As discussed 
below, much of the conflict preemption analysis in Estate of Graham is 
 
 110. J. Robert Brown, Jr., “Conflict Minerals, the DC Circuit, and the SEC: The Law of the 
Circuit Doctrine,” THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.theracetothebottom 
.org/home/conflict-minerals-the-dc-circuit-and-the-sec-the-law-of-the.html.  
 111. LaShawn, 87 F.3d at 1395. 
 112. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 - *8. 
 113. Id. at *8 - *11. 
 114. Id. at *7 (citing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
 115. Id. (discussing Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003), in which the court, en 
banc, told a three judge panel that it should not have been bound by the 1989 ruling in Babcock v. 
Taylor due to decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993 and 1997). 
 116. Id. at *8.  The district court reiterated its “law of the circuit” analysis and discussion 
when it later denied plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2016 WL 4136540 (C.D. Cal. 2016).  The court said it 
would prefer to follow Morseburg in order to be more respectful of Ninth Circuit authority, but it 
had a fundament duty to follow Miller and Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at *1. 
SHIPLEY(DO NOT DELETE) 11/22/2016  4:26 PM 
2017 DROIT DE SUITE, COPYRIGHT’S FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 19 
solid but the court may have relied too heavily on the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s first sale decisions, which were concerned primarily with the 
unauthorized importation of copyrighted goods and the gray market.117  The 
plaintiffs in those cases wanted to block the resale of copyrighted goods 
completely while the artist plaintiffs seeking to enforce the CRRA are 
enthusiastic about the resale of their copyrighted works of visual art.  They 
only want their resale royalties.  Quality King and Kirtsaeng are persuasive 
authority but not directly on point. 
B.  The Impact of the Supreme Court’s First Sale Decisions 
The most important section of the district court’s opinion in the Estate 
of Graham preemption ruling is the discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on the first sale doctrine which, according to the court, teach that 
the “doctrine does not simply create a void to be filled by state regulations” 
and have “so eroded Morseburg that it no longer represents a binding 
interpretation of the first sale doctrine and the CRRA.”118  Accordingly, the 
CRRA conflicts with the first sale doctrine and should be preempted. 
In Estate of Graham the court was correct to acknowledge that first 
sale as codified in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 is the same 
as the first sale doctrine that Congress had codified in section 27 of the 
Copyright Act of 1909.119  It then explained that the Supreme Court has 
discussed the first sale doctrine several times since Morseburg was decided 
in 1980 and these rulings, Quality King in 1998 and Kirtsaeng in 2013, 
undermine the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the CRRA and first sale 
function harmoniously.  The essence of the court’s analysis is that the 
CRRA is not a valid regulation because the Copyright Act is hostile to a 
royalty scheme.120  The situation is no longer analogous to what was at 
issue in Goldstein when Congress had not extended protection to sound 
recordings, leaving the area unattended.  The Court stated in Goldstein that 
“a conflict could develop if a State attempted to protect that which 
Congress intended to be free from restraint”121 and it is now clear that the 
CRRA is encroaching on “subject matter Congress expressly addressed in § 
109(a).”122  The court is saying, in essence, that the Supreme Court made 
this interpretation of section 109 clear in 1998 and again in 2013. 
 
 117. See infra notes 127 to 151 and accompanying text.   
 118. 2016 WL 1464229, at *8. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at *6 - *7.  Cf. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978. 
 121. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559. 
 122. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6. 
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Arguably, the silence of the Copyright Act and its legislative history 
regarding droit de suite allows state regulation of resale royalty,123 but the 
current act was passed in 1976, decades before the Supreme Court’s 
statements about first sale regulation in Quality King and Kirtsaeng.  These 
rulings show that “the doctrine embodies a delicate distribution of rights 
between copyright holders and downstream resellers, ‘leaving buyers of 
goods free to compete with each other [in the secondary market].’”124  
Although the CRRA does not, technically, restrict transfers of art,125 the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Sam Francis Foundation Dormant 
Commerce Clause case concluded, contrary to Morseburg, that the CRRA 
regulates commercial transactions between resellers and buyers and 
restricts conduct among private parties.126  The conflict preemption 
argument against the CRRA is that the statute regulates an area that is 
already regulated by Congress; sections 106(3) and 109(a) of the Copyright 
Act combine to give purchasers of copyrighted art works the right to resell 
those objects without any limits on alienation while the CRRA 
impermissibly restricts downstream transactions.127 
The district court’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s first sale 
decisions and how the CRRA restricts the transfer of art works128 is 
convincing but perhaps overstates the sweep of these first sale holdings.  
The Quality King and Kirtsaeng cases involved efforts by copyright owners 
to block the resale in the United States of their copyrighted works which 
had been acquired by the defendant resellers overseas.  Both cases required 
the Court to interpret and apply not only sections 106(3) and 109(a) but 
also section 602(a)(1) which deals with the importation of copyrighted 
materials. 
L’Anza, the plaintiff in Quality King, made hair care products in the 
United States for sale domestically and abroad.  These products had 
copyrighted labels.  Its distributor in the United Kingdom sold products to a 
distributor in Malta.  These goods reentered the U.S. market without 
L’Anza’s permission, and were resold by unauthorized dealers in the 
United States who had purchased the goods at discounted prices from 
Quality King.129  L’Anza contended that these resales violated its exclusive 
 
 123. Cf. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 – 20. 
 124. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6 (citing Quality King and Kirsaeng). 
 125. Id. at *6. 
 126. Id. at *7 (citing and quoting Sam Francis Foundation, 784 F.3d at 1324 & n.1).  Cf. 
Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978.   
 127. 2016 WL 1464229, at *7.  The royalty undermines first sale, a doctrine which rests on 
the fundamental principle of free alienation of property, by keeping buyers from ever acquiring 
unencumbered title to works of art.  Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 58. 
 128. Id., at *6 - *8. 
 129. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138 – 40. 
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import/distribution rights under section 602(a)(1); but Quality King’s first 
sale defense was successful.130  The question presented was “whether the 
right granted by § 602(a) is also limited by §§ 107 through 120.  More 
narrowly, the question is whether the ‘first sale’ doctrine endorsed in § 
109(a) is applicable to imported goods.”131  The Court answered both 
questions affirmatively.  Where the copyrighted work is lawfully made in 
the United States for export, and is subject to a valid first sale, its 
subsequent re-importation is permissible under section 109 and is not 
prohibited by section 602(a)(1).  That section provides that in some 
circumstances importation violates the exclusive right to distribute copies 
under 106(3), and section 106(3) is in turn limited by sections 107 to 122, 
including first sale in section 109.132 
The plaintiff in Kirtsaeng, the book publisher John Wiley & Sons, also 
alleged that its import/distribution rights under 602(a)(1) were violated by 
defendant Kirtsaeng’s purchase in Asia for subsequent resale in the U.S. of 
copyrighted textbooks that Wiley published in Asia and distributed in Asia.  
Kirtsaeng’s resales in the U.S. of textbooks that he had purchased on the 
open market in Asia were at prices well below those set by Wiley for the 
same textbooks that it made and published domestically.133  The Court 
considered “whether the ‘first sale’ doctrine applies to protect the buyer or 
other lawful owner of a copy (of a copyrighted work) lawfully 
manufactured abroad,” and whether that buyer can “bring that copy into the 
United States (and sell it or give it away) without obtaining permission to 
do so from the copyright owner[.]”134  The Court answered this question 
affirmatively as in L’Anza. Here again, the plaintiff wanted to block 
importation of the copyrighted works and the defendant’s first sale defense 
was successful.135 
The Supreme Court stated in these decisions that the first sale doctrine 
provides “once the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream 
of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to 
control its distribution.”136  This doctrine has created secondary markets by 
“leaving buyers of goods free to compete with each other when reselling or 
otherwise disposing of those goods.”137  It shifts market power away from 
the copyright holder toward competition and is to the “advantage of the 
 
 130. Id. at 152.  See also Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 523 – 24.  
 131. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 138. 
 132. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 523 – 24. 
 133. Kirtsaeng 133 S. Ct. at 1356 – 57. 
 134. Id. at 1355.  
 135. Id. at 1355 – 56. 
 136. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152.  
 137. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1363. 
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consumer.”138  The Court characterized section 109(a) as having a broad 
reach, and that it should not be read in a cramped manner.139  First sale, as 
codified in section 109(a), means that buyers of copyrighted works “are 
free to dispose of [them] as they wish.”140  Subsequent rulings have said 
that this freedom includes the right to resell the goods for whatever price 
the buyer deems appropriate, without regard to the wishes of the copyright 
holder.141  The law is at odds with these principles because it gives 
California artists an advantage not enjoyed by other artists, and it 
disadvantages California art dealers against those outside the state.  
Copyright owners cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in downstream 
markets.142 
Based on these recent statements about the first sale doctrine, it is no 
longer appropriate to analogize the CRRA to the state record piracy law in 
Goldstein as the Ninth Circuit panel did in Morseburg in 1980.  The district 
court in Estate of Graham said that this takes Goldstein out of the way143 
and enabled it to state that Morseburg’s analysis of CRRA’s impact on first 
sale was flawed.  It concluded the CRRA was at odds with the first sale 
doctrine because it impermissibly restricted downstream transactions 
between resellers and buyers of art and not just post-sale income.144  In 
essence, it is appropriate to extrapolate from the Supreme Court’s 
statements about first sale in Quality King and Kirtsaeng to conclude that 
the CRRA regulates an area that is protected by the Copyright Act —a 
purchaser’s rights in the copies he or she has acquired—and thereby it 
“encroaches on a subject matter Congress expressly addressed in § 
109(a).”145  The district court concluded its conflict preemption analysis by 
stating that 
it is a fundamental tenet of federalism that a conflict 
between Congress and a state legislature is resolved in 
favor of Congress.  U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Because the 
CRRA disrupts Congress’s efforts to balance the interests 
of copyright holders and downstream consumers, it must 
be preempted.146 
 
 138. Id.  
 139. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152. 
 140. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355. 
 141. Omega S.A., 776 F.3d at 695.  
 142. Id.  
 143. 2016 WL 1464229, at *6. 
 144. Id. at *7 (citing Sam Francis Foundation, 784 F.3d at 1324 & 1334). 
 145. Id. at *6. 
 146. Id. at *8. 
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There is a counter argument to the district court’s broad application of 
the Supreme Court’s first sale decisions:  Quality King and Kirtsaeng are 
not on point because both cases are really about parallel importation or the 
so-called gray market.  There are price differentials domestically and 
abroad for certain goods which are sometimes great enough to permit 
entrepreneurs to purchase goods overseas, import them, sell them here for 
less than the current domestic price, and still make a profit.147  It was in the 
context of this trade issue that the Court had to construe sections 602(a)(1), 
106(3) and 109(a)(1) in both Quality King and Kirtsaeng. The plaintiffs in 
these cases—the copyright owners—wanted to charge different prices for 
copies of their works in different geographic regions and they also wanted 
to completely block the defendants from importing these goods into the 
United States for resale.148 
In contrast, the plaintiffs in Estate of Graham are not attempting to use 
the CRRA to completely block sales of their copyrighted works of fine art, 
let alone block importation or to even fix prices in downstream markets. 
The artists are fine with resales of their art work.  The California statute 
requires defendants to take certain steps when they sell an artist’s work, but 
those steps do not prevent the auction houses and dealers from reselling or 
otherwise disposing of those copyrighted goods.149  These several steps 
may have undermined the CRRA for purposes of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis by the Ninth Circuit in the Sam Francis Foundation 
ruling,150 but it does not follow automatically that the CRRA does more 
than regulate sale proceeds and post-sale income when it is applied solely 
to California transactions.151  These steps do not fix prices in downstream 
markets for works of visual art.  The CRRA might cause some auction 
houses and collectors to leave California to avoid the burdens the statute 
imposes on them to collect resale royalties,152 but this is not an issue of 
copyright infringement or copyright policy.  In short, the Supreme Court’s 
statements about first sale in Quality King and Kirtsaeng are not directly on 
point in regard to the alleged tensions between the CRRA and the first sale 
doctrine. 
 
 147. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 522.  
 148. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1374 (Ginsburg, R., dissenting). 
 149. Cf. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *6. 
 150. 784 F.3d at 1324.  
 151. Cf. 784 F.3d at 1334 (Berzon, M., concurring). 
 152. Cf. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *7. 
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VI.  Express Preemption Under Section 301(a) of the Copyright 
Act 
Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act worked a dramatic change in U.S. 
copyright law by “creating a single system of federal protection for all 
works of authorship, published or unpublished.”153  It provides that any 
state law claim, whether based on common law or statute, is preempted if: 
(1) it creates “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in 
section 106;” and (2) such rights are claimed in “works of authorship that 
are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject 
matter of copyright.”154  The two criteria for preemption concern the nature 
of the right being asserted and the nature of the work in which that right is 
claimed; these criteria must coalesce.155  On the other hand, section 301(b) 
makes clear that the states may protect rights and interests that are not 
equivalent to those protected by copyright as well as afford equivalent 
protection to non-copyrightable subject matter.156 
Section 301 reflects a clear congressional intent to preempt and 
abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a state that are 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights that copyright owners enjoy and 
that extend to works coming within the scope of copyright.157  “The 
declaration . . . in section 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest and 
most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable 
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act 
preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas 
between State and Federal protection.”158  Unfortunately, section 301 has 
not turned out to be a model of clear, comprehensible drafting,159 and the 
courts have been grappling with its application since the late 1970s. 
There is consensus that determining the scope of preemption under 
section 301 involves two inquiries: what constitutes copyrightable subject 
 
 153. David Shipley, Three Strikes and They’re Out at the Old Ball Game: Preemption of 
Performers’ Rights of Publicity Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20 ARIZ. STATE L. REV. 369, 
374 (1988) [hereinafter “Three Strikes”]. 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
 155. Three Strikes, supra note 153, at 374 – 75. 
 156. 17 U.S.C. § 301(b). 
 157. H. REP. supra note 64, at 131. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 965.  This casebook has a summary of section 301’s 
tortured legislative history including the debates within the House Judiciary Committee over what 
to do about misappropriation and other common law claims with copyright like characteristics.  
Id. at 965 – 68. 
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matter; and what rights are equivalent to those granted by copyright.160  As 
noted earlier, the subject matter of an artist’s claim for royalties under the 
CRRA is a work of visual art.  Paintings, sculptural works, numbered prints 
or photographs, and glass works all come within the subject matter of 
copyright as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works under section 
102(a)(5).161  That cannot be disputed.162  Accordingly, the critical 
preemption issue for the CRRA is whether the artist’s claim under the 
California statute is equivalent to a copyright infringement claim.  The term 
“equivalent” is not defined, the legislative history does not help, and the 
courts have relied on their own resources in determining whether a state 
law protects equivalent rights.163 
The artist’s basic claim under the CRRA is that a defendant, such as 
an auction house, sold her work of art without paying her the required 
royalty.  The defendant will deny liability by raising the first sale doctrine 
under section 109(a); the plaintiff artist sold the work to us, and we are free 
to resell that object without restraint.  The auction house defendant will 
contend that the artist’s claim for a resale royalty is nothing more than a 
garden-variety infringement claim based on a violation of the artist’s 
distribution right under section 106(3), that the CRRA enlarged the 
distribution right, and that the artist’s right to control further distribution of 
the object ended when she sold it to the auction house in the first place.  
The conduct that triggers the claim under the CRRA is the distribution of 
the work.  And thus, it is equivalent to a claim for violation of the 
distribution right and is preempted.164 
The issue of equivalency has troubled courts since the current 
Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978.  The prevailing 
approach is the “extra element test.”165  The test reasons that if state law 
causes of action contain elements that are different in kind from copyright 
 
 160. Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory 
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1112 (1977); Three Strikes, 
supra note 153, at 375.  
 161. See supra notes 64 to 68 and accompanying text.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (the 
definition of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works). 
 162. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 14624229, at *9 (any claims under the CRRA fall within 
the subject matter of copyright). 
 163. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 974 n.6. 
 164. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *9 (citing and quoting from 2 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 8C.04[A][1]. 
 165. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 974 n.6.  A claim is not equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights if it includes an ‘extra element’ instead of or in addition to acts of reproduction, 
performance, distribution or display which alters the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively 
different from an infringement claim.  Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 
693, 716 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
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infringement, the cause of action is not preempted.166  As for the issue of 
equivalency, it can be resolved by determining whether the state law may 
be abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the 
exclusive rights; if the mere act of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, 
performance or display triggers a violation of the state law doctrine, then it 
is equivalent.  On the other hand, if the plaintiff has to show an additional 
element, such as palming off or the existence of a contract or trust 
relationship and a breach of duty, then the state law claim is not equivalent, 
and therefore escapes preemption.167 
The artist’s position is that the CRRA creates an additional right, not 
afforded by the Copyright Act, to ‘downstream’ royalties, and thus it is not 
equivalent.  It is unrelated to copyright and pertains instead to the sale of 
tangible art objects, and copyright ownership is distinct from that material 
art object as provided in section 202 of the Act.  Therefore, this state-
created right does not supplant any rights in section 106.168  However, a 
state law claim can be preempted even if it is not coextensive with 
copyright.  The House Report states that preemption occurs “even though 
the scope of exclusive rights given under the [Copyright Act] is narrower 
than the scope of [rights under state law].”169 
There are several arguments in support of equivalence.  The Ninth 
Circuit in the Sam Francis Foundation decision said that the CRRA 
regulates transactions, not the income of resellers.170  The CRRA grants the 
artist an economic right that increases the economic incentive to produce 
creative works by augmenting the copyright monopoly and simultaneously 
inhibiting the purchaser’s rights under the first sale doctrine.  It impacts 
downstream activities by enhancing the artist’s distribution right and 
inhibiting the purchaser’s right to make further distributions.  As Nimmer 
points out, whether broader or narrower, if the same conduct triggers rights 
or immunities under both federal and state law, then that conduct is 
equivalent.171  The challengers can also assert that the CRRA tries to 
achieve what section 301 proscribes and thus should be preempted.172  
After all, the Register of Copyrights acknowledged that implementation of 
resale royalty in the Copyright Act requires modification of first sale and 
 
 166. H.R. REP. at 132. 
 167. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 716-17; Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, 820 
F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987); Katz, Dochtermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, No. 97 
CIV. 7763(TPG), 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1957, 1959 (S.D. Ill 1999). 
 168. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 – 20. 
 169. H.R. REP. at 131; Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *9. 
 170. 784 F.3d at 1324 – 26. 
 171. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8C.04[A][1]. 
 172. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 220. 
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would alter well-established principles of free alienability in our property 
jurisprudence.173  If enactment of resale royalty legislation, such as an 
amendment to the Copyright Act, would require modification of first-sale 
and our traditions of free alienability of property, then the California 
statute’s imposition of the resale royalty is equivalent to the distribution 
right.  Moreover, the sponsor of the CRRA acknowledged that it might be 
preempted by the Copyright Act.174 
In addition, as discussed in connection with conflict preemption under 
the Supremacy Clause,175 recent Supreme Court decisions hold that the first 
sale doctrine as codified in section 109(a), not only governs, but also 
forbids, efforts to control downstream sales.176  The Ninth Circuit has 
stated that “[a]pplication of the first sale doctrine . . . conclusively reaffirms 
that copyright holders cannot use their rights to fix resale prices in the 
downstream market.”177  The CRRA is a state law that controls downstream 
sales and thereby creates a right that Congress declined to create.  It should 
be preempted under section 301(a) because it inhibits distribution of 
copyrighted paintings and sculptural works and is thus equivalent to the 
distribution right, one of the exclusive rights under section 106.178  Section 
301’s legislative history shows that Congress intended for the section to 
preempt state laws which expand laws that Congress did not wish to see 
expanded179 and congressional silence on the issue of resale royalty 
legislation should not be regarded as leaving this area open to state 
legislation, as was the situation with sound recordings and the state record 
piracy legislation at issue in Goldstein.180 
VII.  Other Preemption Issues and Arguments 
A.  Preemption Issues Were Acknowledged by the Register of Copyrights 
Notwithstanding the Morseburg decision, it is important to note that 
the Register’s 1992 study of droit de suite recommended that “any resale 
royalty law in the United States should be at the federal level” given the 
potential problems of preemption. 181  Moreover, the Register stated that 
 
 173. Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 148 & 134. 
 174. G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 106 – 07 n.6. 
 175. See supra notes 127 to 145 and accompanying text.  
 176. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *9 - *10; 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 
8C.04[A][1]. 
 179. H. REP. at 131. 
 180. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 220. 
 181. Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 86. 
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“[i]mplementation of the royalty would require qualification of the first 
sale doctrine.”182  It also said the question of preemption was not settled, 
that cases and commentary since Morseburg suggested a different result 
under the 1976 Copyright Act,183 and that this had chipped away at 
Morseburg’s foundation.184  The Register’s study discussed a California 
decision citing Nimmer’s opinion that resale royalty was preempted under 
the 1976 Copyright Act185 as well as a federal district court decision 
holding that a Pennsylvania statute regulating motion picture licensing was 
preempted.186  That court had acknowledged Morseburg but concluded, 
after noting the changes made by the Copyright Act of 1976, that although 
the Pennsylvania law did not establish a competing copyright system or an 
equivalent right, it substantially restricted conditions under which a 
copyright holder could distribute and license his or her own work and 
thereby interfered with the copyright holder’s control over the sale or the 
commercial use of their work.187 
Even though the Pennsylvania law regulating motion picture licensing 
was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,188 these 
observations and statements by the Register of Copyrights undermine the 
Ninth Circuit’s statement in Morseburg that the CRRA and copyright law 
function harmoniously.  The tension between the CRRA and the first sale 
doctrine is also acknowledged in the Register’s 2013 study of resale 
royalties which says that Congress could conclude that a variety of 
considerations justify qualification of the first sale doctrine so as to provide 
a resale royalty that benefits artists, and also acknowledges that there 
would not be a constitutional bar to the passage of such a statute.189  After 
all, Congress has broad authority to establish the nation’s intellectual 
property policy,190 the courts are deferential to how the legislature exercises 
this authority,191and this authority would certainly include192 placing limits 
 
 182. Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 148.  The Register also asked whether Congress 
would want to qualify first sale and “abandon well-settled principles of free alienability in Anglo-
American property jurisprudence.”  Id. at 134.  
 183. Id. at 77.  This report cites and quotes from Nimmer who said that the CRRA would be 
preempted under section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976.  Id. at 79 – 80. 
 184. Id. at 83. 
 185. Id. at 83 – 84 (citing and discussing Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 
159 Cal. App. 3d 637 (1984)). 
 186. Id. at 84 – 85 (citing and discussing Associated Film Distributed Corp. v. Thornburgh, 
520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981)). 
 187. 520 F. Supp. at 992 – 94. 
 188. 800 F.2d 369, 376 (3rd Cir. 1986). 
 189. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 59. 
 190. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003). 
 191. Id. at 204. 
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on the first sale doctrine as already done in regard to the rental, lease or 
lending of phonorecords and computer programs.193 
In any event, the several statements by the Register of Copyrights that 
the enactment of an amendment to our copyright statute to provide a resale 
royalty for works of visual art would also require an amendment to the 
first-sale doctrine are strong evidence that the CRRA cannot function 
harmoniously with our well-established first-sale doctrine jurisprudence, 
and that the CRRA should be preempted. 
B.  The CRRA Is Analogous to a Tax on the Proceeds of a Sale. 
Another argument to counter the CRRA’s alleged encroachment on 
section 109(a), which was alluded to in Morseburg,194 is that the CRRA 
does not regulate resale of art, but only the proceeds of the resales.  No lien 
attaches to the object, the buyer of the art object is not secondarily liable 
for the royalty, and the law does not impermissibly restrict the owner’s 
right to sell the painting.195  In essence, it does not restrict the secondary 
market for art in a meaningful way.  It activates only after a resale is 
completed, and is akin to a tax on the revenue derived from the art 
purchaser’s profitable resale of the work of fine art. 
Taxes, which a state or a municipality impose for particular 
transactions or for the purchase and sale of particular commodities, are 
charges that purchasers and sellers of goods routinely pay, collect and 
distribute.196  Such taxes are not seen as restraints on alienation.  The 
CRRA is similar to a tax.  Accordingly, it does not impinge the first sale 
doctrine because it does not effectively limit a seller’s options.  It is no 
more a restraint on alienation than a local ordinance providing that a certain 
percentage of the proceeds on the sale of real estate in the community be 
set aside, held in trust and ultimately used for purchasing property for 
conservation purposes.197 
 
 192. “[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited 
monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . in order to give the public appropriate access to 
their work product.”  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984). 
 193. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2008). 
 194. 621 F.2d at 977 – 78. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 58. 
 197. See, e.g., Block Island Land Trust, TOWN OF NEW SHOREHAM, http://www.new-
shoreham.com/displayboards.cfm?id=14 (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).  The Block Island Land Trust 
was established by legislation passed by the Rhode Island General Assembly in the 1980s.  The 
trust, which acquires and preserves open space on Block Island for conservation, recreation and 
aquifer protection, is funded by a 3% fee on the transfer of real property on Block Island.  The 
Land Trust is administered by five unpaid Trustees who are elected for staggered four-year terms.  
In 2007 Block Island reached a milestone of 43% preserved open space. 
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One problem with this analogy is that taxes are collected and used for 
public purposes, not as additional compensation for the creator/original 
owner of the real or personal property that is being resold.  In addition, the 
majority in the Sam Francis Foundation decision explicitly rejected 
Morseburg’s statement that the CRRA did not restrict the transfer of art198 
by holding that it “facially regulate[s] . . . commercial transaction[s] 
between resellers and buyers” and that it restricts “conduct among private 
parties.”199  It regulates downstream sales of art in conflict with the first 
sale doctrine.200  Moreover, by imposing a royalty right on the artist and the 
purchaser/reseller that cannot be waived, the CRRA arguably restricts what 
section 109(a) meant to be unfettered. It is counter to well-settled principles 
of free alienability in our property jurisprudence.201  The 5% royalty 
prevents the reseller from obtaining the full value of the art object in the 
secondary market, and serves as a disincentive for art investors to resell 
their art.202  This also undercuts copyright’s first sale doctrine.203 
C.  States Can Regulate the Distribution of the Tangible Work 
Section 202 of the Copyright Act204 codifies the important distinction 
between ownership of copyright and ownership of the material object; the 
purchaser of a work of art acquires the object but not, absent a written 
transfer agreement, the copyright in that work.  Thus, droit de suite pertains 
to the sale of the art object, not to copyright.  Accordingly, California’s 
CRRA does not supplement any of the rights specified in the Copyright 
Act.205  The problem with this argument is that droit de suite is an 
economic right that benefits the artist and that supplements and extends an 
artist’s distribution right in section 106(3).  “Civil-law jurists . . . classify 
the droit de suite as an economic right, conceptually no different from 
copyrighting.”206  It augments the copyright monopoly and is at odds with 
the balance between creators, copyright owners and the general public that 
Congress has attempted to achieve in the Copyright Act.207 
 
 198. 621 F.2d at 978. 
 199. 784 F.3d at 1323-24 & n.1.  
 200. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *7. 
 201. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 59 (quoting Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 
134). 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id.; see also Nimmer on Copyright, § 8C.04[A]{1}; WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON 
COPYRIGHT § 18.52 (2016). 
 204. See supra notes 50 to 53.  
 205. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 – 20. 
 206. G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 109 – 10. 
 207. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 219 – 20. 
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On the other hand, there are several decisions involving unsuccessful 
preemption challenges to state laws regulating the distribution of motion 
pictures, in which courts rejected the argument that a state’s trade 
regulation affecting a copyright owner’s monetary return is invalidated by 
the Copyright Act.208  The state statutes at issue in these cases prohibited 
the practice of blind bidding for motion pictures, and set up procedures for 
the open and orderly licensing of movies in the respective states.209  These 
laws were challenged by the movie distributors—the copyright owners—on 
multiple grounds including preemption under the Supremacy Clause and 17 
U.S.C. § 301.210  In essence, the laws were a sufficient burden on the 
copyright owners’ rights to require preemption.211  However, the courts 
stated that there is no “authority for the argument that state trade regulation 
which affects distribution procedures and, indirectly, monetary returns 
from copyrighted property is invalidated implicitly or explicitly by the 
terms of the Copyright Act.”212 
One of the courts explained that the statute did not deprive copyright 
owners of their rights to prohibit reproduction, performance, distribution or 
display of their works.  “Indeed, by providing procedures for the licensing 
of a film, the Act recognizes sub silentio the right of the copyright owner to 
exhibit the motion picture and to grant an exclusive or restrictive license to 
others to exhibit it.”213  This court emphasized that the Supreme Court had 
long recognized the distinction between the bundle of rights which make up 
copyright and the property produced and marketed by virtue of the 
copyright,214 saying that the Supreme Court had rejected the notion that a 
copyrighted work is not subject to state regulation of the manner in which it 
is marketed.215  This court and the Supreme Court also rejected claims that 
the exclusive right to distribute includes the right to distribute in the 
manner most desirable to the copyright owner.216  In short, the authority of 
 
 208. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369, 376 (3rd Cir. 1986); 
Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 441 (S.D. Ohio 1980), aff’d 679 F.2d 
656 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 209. Blind bidding describes the licensing of a movie to a theater owner without the owner 
first viewing the movie.  The practice has been controversial since the 1940s, was subject to 
consent decrees, and caused Ohio and Pennsylvania to enact bills prohibiting the practice, 
restricting other licensing practices, and setting up procedures for open and orderly licensing of 
movies for exhibition in those states.  Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 412 – 13; see also 
Associated Film Distribution Corp., 800 F.2d at 370 – 71.  
 210. Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 441; Associated Film Distribution Corp., 800 F.2d at 376.  
 211. Associated Film Distribution Corp., 800 F.2d at 376.  
 212. Id.  (citing and quoting from Allied Pictures, 679 F.2d at 662-63). 
 213. Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 443.  
 214. Id. at 446 (citing Fox Film v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 130 (1932)). 
 215. Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 128.  
 216. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941). 
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the states to regulate market practices dealing with copyrighted subject 
matter is well established.217 
These statements about state authority to regulate market practices 
involving copyrightable subject matter seem to support California’s 
authority to enact the CRRA.  After all, the obligation imposed on 
California art dealers in regard to resale royalties seems insignificant 
compared to Ohio’s and Pennsylvania’s regulation of the distribution of 
copyrighted motion pictures to movie theaters in those states.  Those 
statutes placed limitations on the copyright owners’ distribution rights with 
respect to their movies and they were held not to be preempted.  The 
CRRA does not limit the copyright owner’s distribution right but it does 
have an impact on the purchaser’s right under the first sale doctrine. 
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the movie 
distributors who challenged the anti-blind bidding statutes in Ohio and 
Pennsylvania had not sold their copyrighted works to the theaters.  Instead, 
they were exercising their exclusive rights to control the distribution and 
public performance of their copyrighted works through rental and lease 
pursuant to sections 106(3) and 106(4) of the Copyright Act.  The anti-
blind bidding preemption decisions do not address the first sale doctrine.  
In short, the strong statements about state authority to regulate market 
practices seem to argue against preemption but the decisions in which these 
statements were made are not directly on point in regard to the preemption 
issues surrounding the CRRA. 
D.  The Contract Analogy 
Defenders of the CRRA argue that since the first sale doctrine does 
not restrict a copyright holder’s right to limit subsequent distribution of 
copies of her works by contract,218 there should be no problem with state 
legislation imposing comparable limitations.  L’Anza, the plaintiff in the 
Quality King case, relied on the terms of its contracts with domestic 
distributors to limit their sales to authorized resale outlets.  It 
acknowledged that those distributors were the owners of the products 
purchased from it, and that unauthorized resale of those goods would 
constitute a breach of contract but not copyright infringement due to first 
sale.219  If the copyright owner can impose limits by contract, why cannot 
the state legislate something as innocuous as a resale royalty? 
 
 217. Allied Artists, 496 F. Supp. at 447.  
 218. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that if a vendee 
breaches an agreement not to sell a copy, he may be liable for breach of contract but not copyright 
infringement). 
 219. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 143. 
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The response in Estate of Graham to this contention is that even 
though it is routine for copyright holders to exercise downstream control in 
exchange for a variety of contractual benefits to resellers,220 a state law like 
CRRA, that modifies first sale, substantially upsets the bargaining positions 
of the parties by giving the copyright holder unprecedented market power.  
“Without § 109(a), a copyright holder would not need to bargain for 
downstream control: they would simply sue for copyright infringement as 
soon as their products entered secondary markets.”  By shifting market 
power from the purchaser/reseller of the art object to the artist/copyright 
holder, the California statute thereby conflicts with first sale.221  It is for 
Congress, not a state legislature, to alter the bargain and create an 
exception to first sale as it has with sound recordings and computer 
software.222  The Copyright Office has acknowledged this by saying that 
implementation of a resale royalty would require qualification of first 
sale.223 
E.  Baby Moose Drawings and VARA’s Legislative History 
Baby Moose Drawings, Inc. v. Valentine is a peculiar 2011 decision in 
which a federal judge remanded an artist’s CRRA claim for royalties to the 
Los Angeles County Superior Court on the ground that removal was 
improper because the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.224  
The defendant, who had resold an artist’s works without paying the royalty, 
argued that the claim was completely preempted under section 301(a) for 
purposes of removal jurisdiction.225  The trial court disagreed, holding that 
the 5% royalty was qualitatively different from the rights granted to 
copyright holders by section 106 of the Copyright Act226 and cited a 
California Court of Appeals decision which held that a state law claim for 
royalties pursuant to a contract was not equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights secured by copyright.227  In ordering remand the court also stated that 
the legislative history of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”) 
made it clear that Congress intended the CRRA to withstand preemption.228 
 
 220. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *4. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Register’s Update, supra note 1, at 58 – 59 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A)). 
 223. Register’s 1992 Report, supra note 7, at 148.  See also supra notes 180 to 192 and 
accompanying text. 
 224. Baby Moose, at *1. 
 225. Id. at *3. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (citing Durgom v. Janowiak, 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 619 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999)).  
 228. Id. (citing Committee on the Judiciary Report on Amendments to the Copyright Act, 
H.R. REP. 514 (1990)). 
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The court in the Estate of Graham preemption ruling indicated that 
Baby Moose could apply to both express and conflict preemption, and the 
court declined to follow it.229  First, the court said Baby Moose was not 
controlling because complete preemption was narrower than conflict or 
express preemption.230  Second, the court disregarded the Baby Moose 
court’s conclusion that the right granted by the CRRA was an extra element 
qualitatively different from those granted in section 106231 and explained 
that the Baby Moose court had not considered the CRRA’s relationship to 
the first sale doctrine.232  And third, the court criticized the Baby Moose 
court’s reliance on a statement in VARA’s legislative history to the effect 
that additions to the Copyright Act would “not preempt a cause of action 
for misattribution of a reproduction of a work of visual art or for a 
violation of a right to a resale royalty.”233  The Estate of Graham court said 
that VARA’s legislative history could not control a question of preemption 
under section 301(a) because VARA itself added section 301(f) to the 
Copyright Act: a separate preemption section applicable to moral rights 
claims under state law.  It also said that a post-enactment interpretation of a 
statute is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation.234  Accordingly, 
the court concluded that VARA’s legislative history does not preclude 
preemption of the CRRA under section 301(a), whether or not Morseburg 
is still good law in the Ninth Circuit.235 
The court in Estate of Graham was correct in finding Baby Moose 
unpersuasive.  It is best treated as a claim for royalties under state law that 
was improperly removed to federal court on the basis of the federal defense 
of preemption.  The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that federal 
question ‘arising under’ jurisdiction exists only when the federal question 
appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well pleaded complaint; the plaintiff is 
the master of the complaint, and here the artist agent’s claim alleged only a 
state claim.236  In addition, the Baby Moose court’s extra-element 
discussion of the CRRA, holding that a CRRA claim was qualitatively 
different from rights granted by copyright, relied upon a state court 
decision in a suit for royalties pursuant to a contract.  That kind of claim is 
 
 229. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *10. 
 230. Id.  The Baby Moose court mentioned the well-established principle that removal to 
federal court cannot be based on a federal defense, including the defense of preemption.  21011 
WL 1258529, at *2 n.2 citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. 
 231. Estate of Graham, 2016 WL 1464229, at *10 (citing Baby Moose, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 72583, at *3 & n. 4). 
 232. Id. (citing Baby Moose at *3). 
 233. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 20 (1990) (emphasis added by the court)).  
 234. Id. (quoting Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC., 562 U.S. 223, 242 (2011)). 
 235. Id. at *11. 
 236. Id. at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011). 
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not equivalent to a claim to resale royalties based on the CRRA.237  
Moreover, the Baby Moose ruling made too much out of one sentence in 
VARA’s legislative history from 1990 regarding Congress’s intent to have 
the CRRA escape preemption under section 301 of the Copyright Act of 
1976.238  VARA added a specific preemption provision in section 301(f) 
and made no changes to section 301(a). 
F.  State Moral Rights Laws and Preemption 
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires member nations to 
protect a creator’s moral rights of attribution and integrity.239  It states: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights and even after the 
transfer of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, 
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.240 
Under this article, an artist retains some authority over his works of 
visual art even after he sells them and even after the transfer of his 
copyright.  The right of integrity enables the artist to object to distortions, 
mutilations or other modifications of her works, and the right of attribution 
enables the artist to claim authorship and stop others from being named as 
the creator.241  These are seen as inalienable and natural rights that exist 
independently of the artist’s copyright.242  In a country where moral rights 
are recognized, an artist would be able to object to the purchaser of one of 
his works defacing or mutilating that painting or sculpture, even though he 
could not object to the purchaser reselling the work.243 
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which added section 106A to 
the Copyright Act, recognized moral rights in the United States for the first 
time.  It was enacted to bring our laws into compliance with Article 6bis.244  
It protects a select group of artists and narrowly defined works; in 
 
 237. Id. at *3 (citing Durgom v. Janowiak, 87 Cal Rptr. 2d 619 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999)).  
 238. Id. at *3. 
 239. The Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 987. These are the two most commonly recognized 
moral rights.  
 240. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, adopted 
by the U.S. Mar. 1, 1989, 102 Stat. 2853.  
 241. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 581. 
 242. The Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 987.  
 243. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36 at 580 – 81.  Moreover, if the artist transferred his 
copyright to the purchaser, then the buyer would be free to reproduce and adapt the work of 
visual art.  Id. 
 244. Id. 
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particular, works of visual art.245  Prior to the passage of VARA, several 
states, including California, enacted legislation that extended moral rights 
to visual artists and works of visual art.246  The California Art Preservation 
Act prohibits the physical defacement, mutilation, or destruction of a work 
of fine art, except by the artist who owns and possesses that work of fine 
art.247  Does this state law conflict with federal copyright policy?  Is it 
subject to conflict preemption or express preemption under section 301?248  
In a way, this is a moot question because VARA amended section 301 to 
add a section that preempts state law claims which are equivalent to moral 
rights claims under section 106A.249  If the California Art Preservation Act 
might have withstood a preemption challenge prior to the enactment of 
VARA, then perhaps the CRRA, by analogy, should withstand that 
challenge as well.  If the limitations or restrictions on an art purchaser’s 
ownership of a work of art which are imposed by the California Art 
Preservation Act would not be preempted, then the restriction on ownership 
imposed by the CRRA should not be preempted either. 
Some of the commentators who discussed this preemption issue 
concluded that a moral rights claim under a statute such as the California 
Art Preservation Act would not have been preempted under section 301(a) 
because moral rights are qualitatively different from copyright in that they 
do not protect an economic interest.250  The counter argument asks whether 
the activity giving rise to the moral rights claim is the same activity that 
gives rise to a copyright violation even if intent or gross negligence has to 
be shown to succeed on the state law claim.251  For example, the 
preemption argument would be that an artist’s claim under the California 
statute to prevent someone from altering his painting or sculpture would be 
equivalent to a claim for violation of the right to prepare derivative works 
based on the copyrighted work. If the owner of an art object also owned the 
 
 245. VARA protects “a painting, drawing, print or sculpture existing in a single copy, in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, 
or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that 
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the 
author.”  17 U.S.C. § 101.  Photographs are protected too if certain conditions are met but not 
movies, books, magazines, advertising and promotional materials, and works for hire.  Id.; The 
Empty Promise, supra note 3, at 990. 
 246. Craig Joyce et al., supra note 36, at 583 – 85. 
 247. Cal. Civ. Code § 987(c)(1). 
 248. See generally G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 105.  
 249. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f). 
 250. Karen Gantz, Protecting Artists’ Moral Rights: A Critique of the California Art 
Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873, 897 – 98 (1981); 
Barbara Hoffman, The California Art Preservation Act, 5 Art & L. 53, 56 (1980); Gordon Katz, 
supra note 20, at 217. 
 251. G. L. Francione, supra note 13, at 130 – 31. 
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copyright, he would defend the claim by raising his ownership of this 
right.252  The artist’s reply is that having to show that the defendant is 
‘intentionally defacing or mutilating’ the work is qualitatively different 
from showing an unauthorized alteration or modification in violation of the 
right to prepare derivative works.  That is an additional element that is not 
part of a copyright infringement action.253  In short, a strong argument was 
made that a state law moral rights claim under the California Art 
Preservation Act would have withstood a preemption challenge under 
section 301. 
On the other hand, there are variations on this hypothetical artist 
versus art purchaser dispute, when the purchaser holds the copyright, which 
give rise to serious conflict preemption issues: the artist’s assertion of a 
moral rights claim under the California statute runs directly into the 
purchaser’s exercise of one or more of the exclusive rights.254  For 
example, an art collector purchases a sculptor’s unique statue and also 
acquires copyright in that work, he then authorizes a company to make 
derivative works, specifically reduced scale plastic reproductions of the 
statue.  These reproductions are offered for sale and the artist the claims 
that this alteration of the statue is actionable under the art preservation 
statute.  The state law claim conflicts directly with the copyright owner’s 
rights and should be preempted under conflict preemption analysis.255 
In summary, some state moral rights claims might have withstood an 
express preemption challenge under section 301.  However, a state moral 
rights claim might have conflicted directly with the rights of the copyright 
owner in situations when the artist transferred his or her copyright to the 
purchaser of the work, and would have thus have been subject to conflict 
preemption.  Similarly, although claims under the CRRA might not be 
equivalent to a copyright infringement claim for purposes of section 301, 
such claims arguably conflict directly with the art purchaser’s exercise of 
rights under the first sale doctrine. 
G.  Patent Exhaustion 
The first sale doctrine is well established in our patent law 
jurisprudence and it is similar to copyright law’s first sale doctrine.  In 
1853, the Supreme Court stated that “when the machine passes to the hands 
of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent] 
 
 252. Id. at 131. 
 253. Cf. id. at 138 (concluding that the California Art Preservation Act would survive an 
express preemption challenge under section 301(a)).  
 254. See id. at 140 – 42. 
 255. Id. at 141 – 42. 
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monopoly.”256  Also known as “exhaustion,” the patent law version of first 
sale makes clear that “once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction 
on [its] use to be implied for the [patentee’s] benefit.”257  The 
inventor’s/patentee’s sale of the patented article exhausts the monopoly in 
that article so that the inventor/patentee may no longer, by virtue of the 
patent, control the use or disposition of the article.258  In a nutshell, “the 
initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that 
item.”259  This doctrine has been applied broadly by the Supreme Court. 
“The theory is that the patentee, by selling the patented article, has 
surrendered his right to control the use and sale of the particular article.  
The buyer may use the article and may sell it to another buyer, who 
likewise may use and sell the article without infringement.”260  First sale 
does not, however, allow the buyer to make or use additional embodiments 
of the invention; the widget can be resold but the buyer cannot make more 
widgets.261 
Would a state statute modifying the patent law exhaustion doctrine in 
roughly the same way the CRRA applies to the resale of fine art be subject 
to preemption?  For instance, imagine Michigan enacting legislation aimed 
at helping the automobile industry, specifying that a patentee was to 
receive a 5% royalty each time certain patented articles were resold.  This 
statute would probably not withstand a challenge because of the Supreme 
Court’s 1989 decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.262  
The Court held unanimously that a Florida statute prohibiting the use of a 
direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls conflicted with 
the “strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not 
merit patent protection” and was therefore preempted by the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution.263  The opinion repeated the principle 
announced in Goldstein that the states have power to adopt rules that 
promote intellectual creation within their own domains,264and that this 
power extended to the subject matter of patents so long as the rule did not 
impermissibly interfere with the federal scheme.265  However, the Florida 
 
 256. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1853). 
 257. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (1873).  
 258. U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942).  
 259. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec’s, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).  
 260. STEPHEN MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 347 (5th 
Ed. 2015). 
 261. Id. 
 262. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 263. Id. at 168 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969)). 
 264. “The patent and copyright clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication, 
deprive the states of” their power to adopt such rules.  Id. at 165 
 265. Id. 
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statute went beyond the scope of protection traditionally available under 
unfair competition doctrine and trade secret law, and restricted the public’s 
ability to exploit unpatented designs in general circulation, therefore 
upsetting the competitive balance in patent law.266 
Although this hypothetical state statute providing a patented device 
resale royalty does not restrict the public’s ability to exploit an article 
unprotected by a patent or copyright like the statute in Bonito Boats or the 
unfair competition laws at issue in Sears and Compco, it does fly in the 
face of patent law’s first sale doctrine which stands for the principle that 
“[t]he authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent 
exhausts a patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from 
invoking patent law to control postsale use of the article.”267  The 
hypothetical state law—by imposing the royalty—would have an impact on 
the postsale use of the patented articles.  It gives the patentee a proprietary 
right that he otherwise would not enjoy and should be preempted under the 
Supremacy Clause.268 
The likelihood that this hypothetical state patent royalty statute would 
be preempted because it conflicts with patent law’s first sale doctrine 
provides another argument for the preemption of the CRRA because the 
CRRA conflicts with copyright’s first sale doctrine.  This is due in part to 
the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court turned to patent law for guidance 
several times when ruling on major copyright law issues.  For instance, in 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. the Court turned to 
the Patent Act’s “staple article or commodity of commerce” principle in 
section 271, and its Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co. decision, 
discussing vicarious liability and contributory infringement in copyright 
law.269  The Court said: 
 
 266. Id. at 167; see generally Rock the Boat, supra note 84. 
 267. Quanta Computer, 533 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).  
 268. This result would be consistent with the Supreme Court’s historic intellectual property 
jurisprudence that emphasizes the public purposes embodied in the Copyright and Patent Clause 
instead of focusing on the proprietary interests of copyright owners and patentees.  Cf. David 
Shipley, Congressional Authority Over Intellectual Property Policy After Eldred v. Ashcroft: 
Deference, Empty Limitations, and Risks to the Public Domain, 70 ALBANY L. REV. 1255, 1257 
(2007). 
 269. 464 U.S. 417, 440-41 (1984).  In this portion of its Sony opinion the Supreme Court 
cited and quoted from 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) which provides that the sale of a “staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use” is not contributory 
infringement.  It also discussed in Rohm & Hass decision, 448 U.S. 176 (1990), and other cases 
which deny the patentee any right to control the distribution of unpatented articles unless they are 
unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use.  Id. at 198.  The Court explained in Rohm & Hass 
that unless a commodity “has no use except through practice of a patented method,” the patentee 
has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes contributory infringement.  Id. at 199. 
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We recognize there are substantial differences between the patent 
and copyright laws. But in both areas the contributory 
infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition that 
adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look 
beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the 
products or activities that make such duplication possible. The 
staple item of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a 
copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective – not merely 
symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of 
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of 
commerce.270 
Similarly, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the 
Court turned to patent law to say that Sony’s staple-article of commerce 
rule would not preclude liability where evidence showed statements and 
actions directed at promoting infringement:271 
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of 
patent law as a mode for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the 
inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright.  We adopt it 
here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear 
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, 
is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.272 
The copyright law and patent law first sale doctrines are similar.  
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the vitality and scope of 
both doctrines in recent decisions.273  If a state law regulating postsale 
transactions involving patented articles would be preempted, there is a 
good argument that the CRRA should be preempted as well since it also 
regulates postsale transactions involving copyrighted works of fine art. 
H.  Critical Commentary 
Several treatise writers have weighed in on the side of preemption of 
the CRRA.  One scholar said that the conclusion in Morseburg that the 
 
 270. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).  
 271. 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005). 
 272. Id. at 936 – 37.  
 273. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs. Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 
(1998); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec’s, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). See also, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 816 
F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed, 84 USLW 3563 (Mar. 21, 2016) (the petition is 
asking the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the impact of the Kirtsaeng and Quanta Computer 
decisions on issues of patent exhaustion).   
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royalty did not conflict with first sale was dubious.274  Another author 
noted that since first sale is considered to exhaust the copyright owner’s 
distribution right with respect to the art object that was sold, the resale 
royalty therefore grants a distribution-type right to the artist.275  Nimmer’s 
treatise says that the federal policy contained in the first sale doctrine 
permits uninhibited resale of art following the initial sale, and that this 
policy cannot be countered by a contrary state law, even when the state 
law’s restraint is simply a royalty instead of a prohibition.276  Finally, 
another commentator wrote that droit de suite should be preempted because 
it attempts to supplement the rights granted by copyright.277 
The district court opinion in the Estate of Graham decision stated, in 
support of its preemption ruling that the leading treatises agree that the 
royalty obligation “acts as a disincentive for art investors to resell their art, 
thereby restricting the secondary markets for fine art in California.  That 
result undercuts the purpose of the first sale doctrine and inhibits the 
uniformity Congress sought to achieve by enacting the Copyright Act.”278  
The court also stated that it was “of the same view as these prominent 
treatises.”279 
VIII.  Conclusion 
“As some seventy countries have recognized, adoption of a statutory 
resale royalty right is one way to level the playing field [for artists], and the 
[Copyright] office accordingly supports Congress’s consideration of such 
legislation.”280  It is readily acknowledged that amending the Copyright Act 
to provide for a resale royalty would require modification to the first sale 
doctrine.281  There is no constitutional bar to such action because, as a 
general matter, Congress has broad authority to determine the nation’s 
intellectual property policy in ways that, in the judgment of the legislative 
branch, will serve the ends of the Copyright Clause.282  The courts defer 
 
 274. HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 1 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 5:188 (2015). 
 275. WILLIAM PATRY, ET AL., LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 89 n. 47 (6th ed. 1986).  
 276. 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8-381.  
 277. Gordon Katz, supra note 20, at 220 (1978).  Even the legislator who sponsored the 
CRRA said it might be preempted under the Copyright Act.  G.L. Francione, supra note 13, at 
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substantially to the will of Congress,283 and this would certainly extend to 
placing new limitations on the first sale doctrine comparable to those 
previously imposed. 
The Register of Copyright’s endorsement droit de suite, while 
acknowledging that Congress would have to alter the first sale doctrine in 
order to provide for a resale royalty, provides a strong argument that 
California’s resale royalty legislation is at odds with the Copyright Act and 
should be preempted.  In addition, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s 
1980 decision in Morseburg v. Balyon, which upheld the CRRA against a 
preemption challenge, this statute is subject to conflict preemption because 
it is at odds with Copyright’s well-established first sale doctrine.  The 
Ninth Circuit should no longer feel bound by Morseburg due in large part 
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Quality King and Kirtsaeng decisions on first 
sale which were issued in 1998 and 2013 respectively.  Moreover, whether 
or not Morseburg is still good law in the Ninth Circuit, the CRRA is 
subject to express preemption under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act 
because it grants a right in copyrightable subject matter that is equivalent to 
the distribution right—one of the exclusive rights granted in section 106—
and it simultaneously limits the first stale doctrine codified in section 
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